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Abstract 
Modern Romania is a nation-state containing space which has long been considered 
marginal - first as part of the Roman Empire and now within the European Union. The 
national narrative of Romania highlights this liminality, focusing on the interactions 
between the Romans and the local Dacians on the northeastern border regions of the 
Empire. Romania still contains significant material remnants of the Iron Age, including 
the Roman Limes, a series of fortifications on the Danube River meant to protect the 
Roman borders. As such, the archaeological tradition of this geographic space is heavily 
entangled with Romania’s identity as a frontier region. This paper outlines the formation 
of Romanian national space, focusing on the period between the seventeenth century 
and 1918. It considers the relationship between the materiality of the Roman Limes and 
ideological frontiers in Romania, examining the role of archaeology in the sustainment 
of the Romanian nation space. 
 
Keywords: Romania, Frontiers, Roman Limes, Ideological Space, Nationalism 
 
 
Introduction 
The foundation of the Romanian nation-state in the nineteenth century was a 
declaration that the intellectual elite of southeast Europe chose to orient themselves 
towards the West rather than the Ottoman East. Romania (Figs. 1, 2) achieved 
international recognition of political sovereignty in 1881, escaping subjugation by the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire as well as the Ottomans. This 
happened primarily because it suited the ‘Great Powers’ of France, Germany, and Great 
Britain to sponsor nation building in the Carpathians rather than permit the expansion 
of the aforementioned empires (Hitchins 1996; Boia 2001; Popa 2015). Romania has 
always been a multicultural space characterized by a need to distinguish itself from its 
immediate neighbors, and the country today has a prolific material past which is haunted 
by over a century of explicit politicization by the construction of particular 
archaeological narratives. This paper will begin by outlining the formation of Romanian 
national space until the end of the First World War in 1918, and then moves to compare 
the relationship between the materiality of the Roman Limes on the Lower Moesian 
Frontier, and the ideological frontier which I argue exists within Romania and Romanian 
archaeology.  
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Popa (2015: 348) points out that presently,  
 
[Romanian] scholars are not directly overtly politicizing their research”, but rather that “the 
situation has reached a point where the nationalistic discourse is so subtle, so embedded in everyday 
archaeological practices and writing, that it becomes invisible to the authors and academic readers of that 
environment. 
 
There are myriad reasons why this has occurred in Romania, and Romania is not at all 
alone in this. Every nation has at times promoted one historical narrative over another.1  
 
 
Figure 1. Romania highlighted within Eastern Europe (E. Hanscam) 
Nationalism and archaeology developed hand-in-hand; as Díaz-Andreu and Champion 
(1996b: 3) write, “the appearance of nationalism stimulated the very creation of 
archaeology as a science . . . [it] was a closed circle. The nation was at the same time the 
basis and the aim of research.” Archaeology was simultaneously flexible enough to 
support imperialism by providing scientific evidence for the evolutionary hierarchy of 
peoples, thereby proving the necessity of the colonial world order (Trigger 2006). 
Academics have established a considerable dialogue on the archaeological work of the 
nineteenth century, work that inspired myths like ethnic nationalism (see e.g. Hobsbawm 
& Ranger 1983; Kohl 1998; Thomas 2004; Lampe & Mazower 2004; Anderson 2006; 
Díaz-Andreu 2008). Cultural-historical archaeology as a theory encouraged a focus on 
ethnicity, accommodating nationalist interpretations “where specific archaeological 
cultures were unproblematically seen as ancestral to contemporary ethnic or national 
groups” (Kohl 1998: 231).  
 
                                                     
1 See e.g. Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996) for a summary of nationalism and archaeology in Europe, 
Hamilakis (2007) for the relationship between the Greek national imagination and archaeological material, 
and Hingley (2000) for an example of the impact of the Roman past on British nationalism. 
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Figure 2. Historical regions of Romania (E. Hanscam) 
Because of this, and in an attempt to “counteract the effects of unseen biases and 
inadequate research designs” (Trigger 2006: 546), archaeology is now a discipline intent 
on the pursuit of reflexivity, or the necessity of conducting socially aware research (e.g. 
Hamilakis 1996; Hodder 2005; McGuire 2008; Alberti et al. 2011; Watts 2013). Preucel 
and Meskell (2004: 16) define social archaeology as an approach that “engages with how 
different peoples inscribe meaning . . . and through this process of inscription, construct 
themselves.”  
 
 
 
The construction of self is key as it applies to those doing the research as well, we 
understand that archaeologists are actors creating the past through personal engagement 
with the material record, and we often criticize those who use this relationship to further 
political agendas. However some like McGuire (2008) advocate for archaeology as 
political action, while Yannis Hamilakis’ (2017) recent work in understanding the 
materiality of the migrant crisis definitively calls for politically engaged scholarship. A 
decade ago, Trigger (2007: 547) said that archaeology is becoming an “increasingly 
effective basis for understanding social change.” A great deal of social change has 
occurred in the past ten years, and archaeologists are a) engaging with extremely 
contemporary events (Gardner 2017), and b) struggling to understand how to research 
in a way that combats resurging nationalism without becoming overtly politicized.2 It is 
difficult, because we want to avoid creating a dichotomy between our own personal 
subjective views of how the past should be treated and those which further nationalist 
agendas.  
                                                     
2 A topic of much discussion following a session on social boundaries in the Roman world at the 
Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference 2017 (Durham, 28-31 March). 
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In some regions, like Romania, archaeology remains politicized in the old cultural-
historical sense and scholarship continues to (at times explicitly) support the nationalist 
agendas of the state. Texts which are otherwise rigorous include statements like  
 
The territory inhabited by Romanians has a well-marked individuality that, on the whole, and in spite 
of its large variety and complexity, has a remarkable homogeneity and symmetry. Indeed, one may 
confidently assert that the unity of the land has much to do with the unity of the Romanian people 
(Spinei 2009: 13). 
 
There are an increasing number of local and international commentaries on Romanian 
archaeology, which highlight advances being made. Popa (2015) provides a detailed 
analysis on the relationship between the Late Iron Age and politics in Romania, building 
on the work of scholars like Kaiser (1995), Niculescu (2002, 2004), Lockyear (2004), 
Dragoman (2009), and Enea (2012). Boia (2001) is the authority on the ideological 
construction of Romanian national history, an area in which Deletant (1991), Verdery 
(1991) Hitchins (1992), and Iordachi (2004) have also made significant contributions. 
But attitudes within the discipline can be very similar to those towards the country as a 
whole. Romania is marginalized within Europe, just as the Romanian archaeological 
tradition is subject to dismissal and criticism. 
 
On January 1st, 2014 the UK granted Romanians and Bulgarians free access to the UK 
labor market, inspiring a wave of xenophobia on the part of the British public, a wave 
which was reignited after Britain voted to leave the EU in June 2016.3 Romanians, 
despite their EU membership status, are continually seen as not quite European (and 
therefore undeserving of benefits such as access to jobs made available through the 
freedom of movement for workers). In a similar vein, Todorova (2009: 193–4) writes 
how discourses about the Balkans in general places the territory within a “cognitive 
straightjacket” propagating “aggressive, intolerant, barbarian, semi-developed, semi-
civilized, and semi-oriental” stereotypes.  Romania, located on the margins of Europe 
bordering the East, is included within the Balkan discourse. Boia (2001: 186) writes, “we 
Romanians represent the first circle of otherness, sufficiently close for our curious 
configurations and disturbing forms of behavior to be highlighted all the more strongly 
by contrast . . . ”. Romania is a liminal space. If we generalize the disparate voices of 
Europe into a pan-European identity or European denationalization (eg. Sassen 2010), 
then Romania acts as a borderland separating Europe and the East. It is also a 
borderland within archaeology, a place where the past is still presented through a 
                                                     
3 See eg. Petre, J & Walters, S. Exposed: What they DIDN'T tell you about new wave of migrants heading for 
booming Britain, accessed 2 May 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2530503/Exposed-What-
DIDNT-tell-new-wave-migrants-heading-booming-Britain.html; The Guardian, Bulgarian and Romanian 
immigration hysteria 'fanned by far-right', accessed 2 May 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/jan/03/romanian-bulglarian-uk-immigration-hysteria-far-right; Agerholm, H.  Brexit: Wave of 
hate crime and racial abuse reported following EU referendum, accessed 2 May 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-eu-referendum-racial-racism-abuse-hate-
crime-reported-latest-leave-immigration-a7104191.html. 
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Figure 3. Roman Dacia highlighted on map of the Roman 
Empire, By Shadowxfox - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=45059715 
continued reliance on antiquated archaeological theories like Kossinna’s cultural-
historical archaeology (Trigger 2006). Romania is not alone in this, Maran (2017: 21) 
points out that “most archaeological cultures of the Southeastern European Neolithic, 
Copper Age and Bronze Age are based on little more than the distribution of certain 
pottery features within the political borders of nation states;” and similarly, processual 
archaeology “is still a living tradition” for Mesolithic studies in Northern Spain 
(González Morales & Fano Martínez 2005: 25). 
 
Romania was also a marginal 
region in antiquity. The 
Romans established the 
province of Moesia Inferior 
south of the Danube in the 1st 
century CE (Fig. 3) and built a 
series of fortifications on the 
Danube River, known today as 
the Roman Limes of the lower 
Danube (Hanson & Haynes 
2004; Oltean 2008; Matei-
Popescu 2010; Zahariade & 
Karavas 2015). They also tried, 
and failed, to hold the province 
of Dacia in the central 
Carpathian Mountains.4 This 
region resisted incorporation 
into the Roman Empire 
partially because of the continued pressure of migrating populations moving west from 
the Russian steppe. The Carpathian Gap, the lowlands between the Carpathian 
Mountains and the Black Sea, was a popular route into Europe for the steppe tribes of 
the 4th– 8th centuries (Ellis 1998; Curta 2001). The Roman fortifications and legions 
could not withstand the continued pressure, leading eventually to the complete 
abandonment of the region. From a Roman-centric viewpoint, the provinces of Dacia 
and Moesia Inferior were vulnerable, being out on the margins of civilization.5 It is 
perhaps ironic that Romanian nationalism initially fixated on the Romans as the heroic 
ancestors who could bring stability, when stability was something they continually 
struggled to provide in antiquity.      
 
In this paper I will argue for a new way of understanding both the ideological 
development of regions such as modern-day Romania, and the archaeological traditions 
of these spaces. As is explained below, the foundation of the Romanian nation-state 
                                                     
4 Dacia was conquered by Trajan in 107 CE and held until 271-275 when Aurelian organized a withdrawal 
south of the Danube. 
5 There are a number of similarities with the Roman Frontier in Britain to the northwest, for a study on 
the impact of the Roman past to modern day Britain, see Hingley (2015). 
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drew heavily on the Iron Age to find what Popa (2015: 339) terms the “tangible 
distinctiveness” necessary for national legitimacy. This, combined with the significant 
Iron Age material landscape (including the remnants of the Roman Limes), and the 
continued view of Romania as marginalized within Europe, creates a geographic space 
which continues to be entangled with the frontiers of antiquity. We can understand the 
relationship between people and space with theories like differential inclusion, which 
argues that as people move across borders, they experience places which are open to 
some but closed to others depending on their cultural background and identity 
(Richardson 2013). Romania has yet to face migratory pressures like other nations in 
southeast Europe, but this is not a precluded eventuality – it stands to reason that the 
region will once again host migrating populations. This has happened at multiple times 
in the past – in addition to the migrations of the 4th- 8th centuries, the Carpathian Basin 
and lower Danube are also on one of the major proposed hominin migration routes 
(Mellars 2006). In 2002 Trinkaus et al. (2003) discovered the oldest (at the time) remains 
of anatomically modern humans in Europe in the Peştera cu Oase cave system, located 
in the southwest Carpathian Mountains. Given the likelihood of future migrations, we 
therefore need to question the creation and sustainment of ideological and cultural 
barriers in regions like Romania, in addition to promoting a more nuanced view of the 
archaeological traditions which contribute to the construction of this frontier space.  
 
I will begin by detailing the formation of the Romanian national space focusing on the 
period between the seventeenth century and the establishment of Romania Mare (Greater 
Romania) in 1918. I will then consider the relationship between the materiality of the 
Roman Limes and ideological frontiers in Romania, aiming to theorize how border 
regions like Romania entangle themselves with the past. I will conclude with the need to 
understand nationalist archaeologies in terms of the cultural space they generate and 
sustain. 
 
The Formation of Romanian National Space 
The idea that descendants of 2nd century Roman colonists still inhabited a region in 
southeastern Europe first appears in print in the seventeenth century, with the 
publication of two treatises written by pro-Polish Moldavian chroniclers. Grigore 
Ureche (ca. 1590-1647) and Miron Costin (1633-1691) both knew Latin and recognized 
the potential benefits of creating a lasting link between the Romanians and the Polish, 
who “formed a powerful potential ally for the 17th Century Moldavians, for as the self-
styled ‘last bastion of defense for Roman Christendom,’ they might be expected to 
sympathize with the sons of Rome” (Verdery 1991: 324; cf. Hitchins 2001). Boia (2001: 
129) agrees: “We find the ethnic unity of the Romanians, or at least their relatedness and 
common origin, affirmed as clearly as we could wish starting with Grigore Ureche.” 
Because Latin was the language of culture throughout Europe at this time (Russia even 
considered itself the ‘third Rome’) any link to the Romans conveyed a sense of prestige. 
Ureche and Costin therefore “claimed a Romanian origin for Trajan’s Roman colonists” 
(Verdery 1991: 324).  
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Yet the popular dissemination of such a link was controversial, especially among the 
Orthodox priests, who were trying to resist the incursion of Catholicism. As Verdery 
(1991: 32) suggests, “those struggling to oppose the incursions of the ‘Roman’ faith did 
not, it seems, find a Roman origin wholly convenient.” At this time the dispute remained 
was fixed within what Anderson (2007) calls “religiously imagined communities,” largely 
as a matter of religious identity, as it was too early in the development of national 
thought for the notion of borders fixed by language and ethnicity. It did, however, 
combine the “two major components of the European tradition – the imperial and the 
Christian” (Mishkova 2015: 137). Byzantium played an important role as the lawful heir 
to the Roman Empire and the keeper of the Orthodox faith (Mishkova 2015); Ureche 
and Costin “emphasized the role and the greatness of the early Romanians as a separate 
nationality, albeit one that had been part of the Byzantine world” (Tanașoca 2002: 47). 
Tanașoca (2014: trans. in Mishkova 2015: 138) elaborates: “in the spirit of the Romanian 
humanists of the 17th and 18th centuries the idea about Orthodox solidarity and the 
nostalgia for the Byzantine Empire goes along with a very strong feeling of national 
identity that acquires an important Byzantine dimension”. The emphasis on the 
Byzantine Empire, which had only relatively recently fallen to the Turks in 1453, created 
a tangible connection to Rome while simultaneously rejecting anything Ottoman in these 
formerly Roman lands. 
 
Unlike the nationalism of the late nineteenth and early-mid twentieth century, the idea of 
a Roman heritage for the peoples of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania meant that 
they were specifically promoting a non-autochthonous origin. Autochthonism is an 
interesting concept, which is not widely known outside of the social sciences. It is a 
specific brand of indigenism (or indigenous nationalism) which was popular in the 
former Ottoman lands in Eastern Europe: the autochthonist population was the people 
who could prove they were the first to inhabit a territory. Zenker (2011: 65) defines 
autochtony as the proclaimed original link between “individual, territory, and group.” 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary all have their autochothonist narratives, Romania’s was 
found in the “application and negotiation of the alternative pasts of the Romans and 
Dacians” while Bulgaria worked with Thracian, proto-Bulgarian, and Slavic pre-history 
(Trencsényi 2010: 26; cf. Mishkova & Daskalov 2014). Hungary, on the other hand, had 
a narrative of identity that focused on the Huns, thus attempting to “undermine the 
classical pedigree of their competitors” (Trencsényi 2010: 26).  Likewise, de Francesco 
(2013) details the calls within nineteenth century Italy for identities with privilege derived 
from Roman ancestry, or links to peoples from the pre-Roman era like the Etruscans. 
Smith (1986: 183) notes how “in the myths of the community its origins reach back into 
a mysterious and primordial time.” This lack of clarity, useful in the sense that it thereby 
makes it difficult to disprove, is particularly challenging when there is a corresponding 
lack of archaeological knowledge.  
 
Returning to the Romanian autochthonist narrative, in which the Romans were the 
invaders and civilizers of the local tribes, we are still not entirely clear on what happened 
to the local Dacians after the Romans arrived (see Oltean 2007). It is certain, however, 
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that an argument for a pure Roman heritage precludes any local element. This trend 
continued into the early nineteenth century, spreading to Transylvania, which was then 
ruled from Vienna by the Austro-Hungarians, where Greek Catholic intellectuals6 used 
the idea of Roman origin to argue for autonomy from Hungary. The grandeur of Rome 
so impressed Samuil Micu (1745-1806), Gheorghe Șincai (1754-1816), and Petru Maior 
(1756-1821) that they used “mastery histories and pioneering grammars [to define] the 
uniqueness of the Romanian ethnic community” as the heirs to the Roman Empire 
(Niculescu 2001: 92; cf. Deletant 1991). Micu in particular linked the origins of the 
Romanian history to the foundation of Rome by Romulus and Remus, arguing that the 
line of descent was continuous since Trajan must have exterminated the Dacians (Micu 
1792, translated in Niculescu 2001). They all employed linguistics to support their 
theories, attempting to replace the traditional Cyrillic alphabet with Latin. Maior wrote 
the Lexicon de Buda in 1825, arguing that Romanian was derived from a ‘Vulgar Latin,’ 
whilst attempting to replace all foreign words with those of Latin origin (Niculescu 
2001). This combination of history and language corresponded to the popular notion of 
the nation as a people, united on the basis of common origins, in a community with a 
shared language and history. The Transylvanian School considered the Romanians to 
exist as a unified people throughout Transylvania, Wallachia, the Maramures, Moldavia, 
and the Banat, separated only by externally imposed political boundaries (see Fig. 2). 
 
The Latinist School followed the Transylvanian School in seeking the continued spread 
of this Romanian heritage. Between 1830 and 1860 interpretations of the Romanian past 
that do not uphold Latin purity are almost non-existent. Boia (2001: 87) describes the 
aims of the Latinists succinctly, “the excellence of the foundation myth guaranteed the 
excellence of the Romanian future, in spite of the mediocrity of the present. Through 
the Romans, the Romanians could present themselves as the equals of anybody.” In 
1853, August Treboniu Laurian published his History of the Romanians which began with 
the foundation of Rome in 753 BCE. This idea of equating Romanian history with 
Roman was not without dissent from Romanian scholars, who became increasingly 
vocal after Laurian also tried to create a nonsensical “artificial language” out of 
Romanian, purified from non-Latin elements. Boia argues that Laurian’s work was both 
the “highest expression” of Latinism, while also its “swan song” (2001: 87). 
 
The autochthonous element began to return in 1857, when Brătianu published his 
Historical Studies on the Origins of our Nationality, which argued that the Romanians descend 
from the Thracians, Celts, and the Romans. This had clear political motives, as the 
Thracians (and thus the Dacians) symbolized longevity in the land, while the Romans 
granted the aura of civilization, and Celts (or the Gauls) linked the Romanians to the 
culturally admired French. Scholars largely focused, however, on the role of the Dacians 
in comprising Romanian identity, and began to question the work done by the Latinists. 
In 1860 B. Hașdeu thoroughly debunked their efforts by proving they had built the 
                                                     
6 The Greek Catholics, also known as Uniates, were a separate sect of Orthodox Catholics who 
recognized the authority of the Pope and Catholic dogma, but likewise included Byzantine rather than 
Latin rites; their church was formally established in 1596.     
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entire thing based on a forced interpretation of ancient sources (Boia 2001). His work 
Did the Dacians Perish? ascertained that the Dacians survived the Romans, which opened 
up a whole new world of possibilities for the Romanian national narrative. Trencsényi 
(2011: 23) describes Hașdeu as representing the “Romantic-liberal heritage” but turned it 
to a more “directly ethnicist direction”. This was an almost parallel contrast to M. 
Eminescu (1850-1889), the eminent Romanian poet of the nineteenth century who came 
from a Junimist critique of liberal nationalism (Trencsényi 2011). Trencsényi (2011: 22) 
writes  that Eminescu’s “sociological insights crystallized around a single dichotomy: the 
conflict between the ‘positive classes’ and the ‘superimposed strata,’ that is, the 
autochothonous and the alien.” He is especially important in the entangled narrative of 
Romanian historiography and nationalism because his work “helps us understand how 
the political projects, the historical narratives and the normative discourse of the 
‘national self’ mutually conditioned each other” (Trencsényi 2011: 23). Although he 
followed in the “intellectual tradition of Vico, Montesquieu, Herder…Hegel, and 
Comte,” Hașdeu also pioneered the intellectual engagement between Romania and the 
Slavic East Central Europe, referencing Slavic studies in his own work (Trencsényi 2011: 
24). Hașdeu’s education provides clues as to why he took such an alternative view. He 
was from northern Bessarabia, which was then part of the Russian Empire, and was 
educated at Kharkiv University in Ukraine (Marinov 2015). His work embodies changing 
perceptions about the origins of the Romanians. Hașdeu initially rejected the idea of 
Dacian Latinization, but believed that “ethnic fusion was part of the formation of [the] 
Romanian nation” (Trencsényi 2011: 27). He later became more accepting of the 
‘Dacian vision’ and as Trencsényi (2011: 27) writes, “turned to an autochthonist 
narrative of ethnogenesis.”  
 
Scholars had considered the Dacians as possible ancestors of the Romanians in the 
previous century,7 but dismissed them for various reasons. One thought the Dacians 
were unsuitable because they were Scythians and worshipped the Slavic gods (Marinov 
2015: 23). Verdery (2001: 36-7) notes that the Dacians,  
 
made greater headway once the creation of a Romanian state had diminished the need to gain European 
support for independence…unlike Latinism, Dacianism meant independence in politics, for pre-
Roman Dacia had been powerful within its region and had even exacted tribute for a time from Rome.  
 
Furthermore, the Dacians were seen to have had a deeper, more intangible and spiritual 
connection with the land, in line with Romantic nationalist thought (Zub 1981). There 
were specific political advantages to such a claim– Hungary had previously justified 
ownership of Transylvania by claiming it was empty when the Magyar nomads entered 
in 896 CE. The old theory that the Romans exterminated the Dacians did not give the 
Romanians much of an argument, as it was well known the Romans abandoned Dacia in 
                                                     
7 Actually, Greek intellectuals like D. Philippide, D. Fotino used ‘Dacia’ in the first half of the 19th century 
to refer to the modern Romanian space, and accepted the idea of Daco-Roman mixing (Marinov 2015: 
23). 
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271 CE.8 If, however, instead, the Romans and the Dacians interbred, then it was logical 
that a Dacian population would remain after the Roman retreat in their homeland of 
Transylvania (Verdery 2001). Furthermore, the Dacians provided a new aspect of 
longevity to Romanian identity. Through this mysterious people, scholars could trace a 
lineage back into the mists of history rather than relying on the concrete timeline of the 
Romans. As the Dacians began to appear in the national past, archaeological work also 
began to appear as a means of accessing a people who appeared far less frequently in 
written sources than the Romans. Such a trend is reflected upon in the work of Enea 
(2012: 94), who writes, “the emergence of archaeology in Romania is linked to the 
search, development, and affirmation of the national identity.” In 1858, C. Bolliac (1813-
1881) began an amateur archaeological quest to find the remains of the ancient Dacians, 
emphasizing that, “[Our] nobility is as old as the soil…” (as translated in Boia 2001: 92). 
Bolliac defined ‘Romanianness’ in terms of “climatic determination, stressing that the 
Romanians were fatally wedged between the poles of north and south, past and future, 
archaism and modernity.” (Bolliac in Boia 2001: 92). He situated Romania spatially 
between the West and the East, blaming the “capricious national character” on the 
“mixing of barbarism and civilization, Orient and Occident” (Trencsényi 2011: 6). For 
Bolliac, to be on the margins of Europe and susceptible to Eastern influences was at 
least partially to blame for the contemporary backwardness of Romania. The mission of 
Romanian archaeology was to stir up the Dacian substratum, previously overshadowed 
by the brilliance of the Romans, as a way of emphasizing the ‘pre-Ottoman’ Romanian 
past. Marinov (2015: 23) writes that Bolliac admired the Dacians because they were a 
“big and powerful nation, with a sublime religion based on a belief in immortality”, and 
because they were also apparently the first to convert to Christianity.9  
 
Continuing Bolliac’s work, A. Obobescu taught the first course in archaeology at the 
University of Bucharest in 1874. Enea (2012: 94) writes that “he was the first to 
introduce scientific methods into the archaeological approach [in Romania].” G. 
Tocilescu published the first synthesis of Romanian historiography in 1880, stressing the 
Dacians over the Romans, or Dacia before the Romans (Enea 2012; O Riagain & Popa 
2012; Marinov 2015). He scorned the idea that the Getae10 and Dacians were 
German/Gothic, Celtic, or Slavic, and asserted their Thracian character (Marinov 2015). 
Tocilescu specifically did not equate the Getae and the Dacians, preferring the later as 
they were “morally purer” (Marinov 2015: 25). Nonetheless, subsequent Romanian 
historiographical works treated the Getae and the Dacians as the same people. Despite 
the lack of clarity regarding the identity of Dacians, it was impractical for academics to 
wholly abandon the notion of Roman descent. The new theory henceforth became 
                                                     
8 271 CE is the common date for Aurelian’s abandonment of Dacia, it may have occurred up till 275 (Ellis 
1998). 
9 Herodotus (4.93) writes, “Their [the Getae] belief in their immortality is as follows: they believe that they 
do not die, but that one who perishes goes to the deity Salmoxis, or Gebeleïzis, as some of them call 
him.” 
10 The Getae are a Thracian tribe which once lived in the region of the lower Danube, known from 
ancient sources like Strabo (7.3.13) who described them as a people separate from the Dacians. Romanian 
historiography, however, tended to treat the two as one in the same, creating the united ‘Geto-Dacian’s’ 
which provide the autochthonous connection to the national space (Niculescu 2004).   
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known as “Daco-Roman continuity,” which alleged the intermixing of Roman and 
Dacian and granted the Romanians the benefits of a less rigid identity, which 
nonetheless sustained their marginal European identity. 
 
Romanian National Space post-Independence 
The shift from a pure Latin inheritance to varying degrees of Dacian only occurred after 
the Romanians began to achieve political independence. Despite a failed revolution in 
1848, 1859 saw the formal union of Wallachia (modern Oltenia and Muntenia, see Fig. 
2) and Moldavia in the “United Principalities of Romania,” with the “Kingdom of 
Romania” emerging in 1881 upon the addition of Dobrogea. These original forays into 
Romanian identity were all results of early attempts to appeal to an international 
audience. Initially the Moldavian Latinists sought Western aid for the ‘sons of Rome’ 
against Ottoman oppression, and the Latinists sought to solidify Romanian identity as 
older and more civilized than that of the Hungarians. Romanian scholars turned towards 
a Dacian origin only after Romania gained some political independence. Dacia was more 
of a ‘manifest destiny’, a call to the homeland in accordance with the contemporary idea 
that people’s souls are formed by the soil on which they are born (Verdery 1991). 
According to the principles of ethnic nationalism, if Romania wanted to claim territory 
from Hungary, they had to prove that their people had an older claim to that land. Since 
the time at which the Romans entered into the Carpathians is well documented, the 
Romanians had, instead, to use the less tangible longevity of the autochthonous Dacians 
to preempt the Hungarian Magyars.    
 
Romania gained significant political power by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Prior to First World War they controlled Moldavia, Wallachia, and Dobrogea,11 they 
were allied with Austro-Hungarian Empire, and they were on a broadly level playing 
field with other European nations. The emphasis on Romanian identity changed from 
Latin purity and continuity to a reflection of a time in the past when the ‘Romanians’ 
had political independence. In other words, the new Romanian state was the heir to the 
Dacian ‘nation’ that the Romans had encountered in the 1st century CE. This Dacian 
nation was,  
 
no mere agglomeration of a number of savage tribes with a shifting population, scattered loosely over 
extended territory with a complete lack of political and national cohesion such as the Romans had found 
in Dalmatia or Thrace or Pannonia or Moesia; here was a nation, organized, powerful, conscious of 
itself (Pârvan as translated in Boia 2001: 95).  
 
Not only was Dacia supposedly more advanced than the other tribes in the region, it 
displayed a level of cohesion remarkable for Iron Age tribes in the Carpathian Basin. 
Vasile Pârvan (1882-1927), as quoted above, wrote the seminal work on Romania’s 
Dacian heritage, in which he outlined an image of Dacian civilization similar to the 
current perception of traditional Romanian culture. Pârvan went on to become “the 
                                                     
11 They annexed Southern Dobrogea in 1913 after allying with the Greeks and the Serbians to defeat the 
Bulgarians in the 2nd Balkan War. 
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Figure 4. Geographic regions, map by E. Hanscam, data © OpenStreetMap 
contributors, CC-BY-SA 2.0 
patriarch of the Romanian archaeological establishment,” conducting pioneering 
excavations at the Roman city of Histria on the Black Sea coast (Kaiser 1995: 101). His 
work, which according to Boia (2001: 95; see also Iordachi and Trencsenyi 2003: 428) 
was “unassailable from a methodological point of view,” suggested that the Romanian 
nation-state “has been a ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ historical outcome of the struggle for 
political union.” Pârvan is not alone for assuming a ‘natural’ national evolution. The 
nation as a “human constant” was a prevalent attitude among the scholarly community 
for much of the early-mid twentieth century, with scholars often deploring its harmful 
effects yet taking it for granted (Smith 1986: 7). 
 
In the years immediately after First World War, Romania achieved its greatest territorial 
extent, adding the territories of Banat, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania. The 
country then became known as România Mare or ‘Greater Romania’. Despite the obvious 
success of the ‘heirs’ of the Dacians, not everyone agreed with a solely Dacian heritage; 
after all, the Romans were still the great civilizers, and fledgling Romania was not yet so 
powerful that it could abandon the notion of a common European heritage. The theory 
of Daco-Roman continuity therefore provided a common ground for emphasizing the 
Dacians, while still recognizing the positive influence of the Romans. Most importantly, 
it allowed for the continued perception that the Romanians were the “Romance Island 
set in the heart of a Slavic sea” (Light & Dumbraveanu-Andone 1997: 31). Ideological 
separation from the Hungarians remained important, as Romania had only recently 
received the territory of Transylvania which had a significant Hungarian population 
clamoring for autonomy (Brubaker 2006). 
Romania’s Roman 
past also received 
much international 
attention during 
this period, as 
Seton-Watson, a 
professor at the 
University of 
London wrote, 
“we are dealing 
with perhaps the 
most obscure 
corner of Western 
history . . .there is 
simply no parallel 
for the mysterious 
silence which surrounds the Romanians in the thousand years following the withdrawal 
of Aurelian and his legions” (Seton-Watson 1934: 192). These international academics 
also projected the Romanians backwards into history, attempting to understand the 
modern success of the Romanian nation through a long-term civilizing process that 
began in antiquity.  
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The most important aspect of Romanian nationalism is its continued propagation of an 
ideology, which grounds the nation as a frontier. Romania is on the margins of Europe, 
defending the borders of the West from eastern incursions. Romania is also the center 
of Latinity surrounded by Slavic nations, and it must therefore defend its national 
borders just as the nation itself is in turn defended as a border of Europe. The 
geography of the region (Fig. 4) facilitated centuries of cultural interactions which used 
the natural features (the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains) to their advantage. In this 
sense the physical landscape is key to the frontier identity, with the river barriers that 
invited fortifying or the mountains and sea which channeled migrations along certain 
routes. In the 1920s V. G. Childe referred to the Balkans as the ‘bridge’ between Europe 
and the Near East during the Neolithic, and it is apparent that Romania along with 
Bulgaria will continue to play a key role in the relationship between Europe and the 
Near East, as well as the European Union and the Russian sphere; making it vital that 
we understand the intellectual process behind the creation of the modern nation. 
 
The Roman Limes and Ideological Frontiers 
As outlined above, from the eighteenth century onwards, Romania has intentionally 
created itself as a border nation, taking advantage of the marginal identities of, first the 
Romans (marginal in respect to their more-recent Ottoman past), then the Dacians, and 
finally, a combination of the two in the Daco-Romans. Romania has a diverse, vibrant, 
and tenacious population, but the nationalist rhetoric continues to emphasize the Latin 
and native element over anything Slavic or Ottoman (Niculescu 2002). This is partially 
due to the overwhelming presence of the Roman-Dacian narrative on the physical 
landscape. Romania contains some of the most extensive Roman fortification networks 
in Europe (Oltean 2007). Levels of archaeological investigation vary from the well-
studied Sarmizegetusa Regia and nearby settlements in the Dacian heartland of the 
Orăştie Mountains (Diaconescu 2004; Oltean 2007; Fodorean et al. 2013), to the Roman 
fortifications of Dobrogea, of which a few have extensive research histories,12 but many 
remain practically untouched. The Roman Limes fall into this latter category, but can 
offer insight into how the lower Danube frontier reinforces Romania’s defensive, border 
nation agenda. 
 
The Roman frontier on the lower Danube, also known as the Moesian Limes (Fig. 5), 
consists of a series of fortifications stretching from Singidunum (modern Belgrade) to 
Halmyris in the Danube Delta (Whittaker 1994). The entire region is not actually a 
national boundary – a section of the Limes lies downstream from where the Danube and 
by extension the Limes form the Romanian-Bulgarian border. Most important is how 
archaeologists and frontiers continue to interact. I believe that the Roman archaeologist 
travelling to Dobrogea views the landscape as a military frontier, focusing on a relatively 
brief period of time in the past, connecting it to what they see in the present. Related to 
the concept of ‘being in the world’, which Thomas (2012) argues is fundamentally a 
                                                     
12 See Wilkes 2005 for a summary on the Roman Danube; Hanson and Oltean 2012 on the Valu lui 
Traian; Lockyear 2002 and Lockyear et al. 2005 for excavations at Noviodunum; Zahariade & Phelps 
2002, Zahariade 2013, Zahariade & Karavas 2015 for excavations at Halmyris 
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relational involvement, the physical remnants of the Limes are powerful symbols in 
otherwise foreign landscapes. Standing on unexcavated forts like that of Salsovia, 
looking across the Danube (see Fig. 6), a Roman archaeologist cannot help but relate 
their knowledge of antiquity to where they are in the present. They experience the 
Lower Moesian Limes through the lens of other Roman frontiers, exemplified by recent 
attempts to unite them all in one pan-continental UNESCO World Heritage Site 
(Hingley 2015). Frontiers are all about perspective, and archaeologists focusing on the 
Roman frontier look outward to see what the fortifications are defending against. In this 
region we know that the Roman legions focused primarily on the tribes north of the 
Danube (Zahariade & Gudea 1997). By experiencing the landscape through the aim to 
view, understand, or excavate the frontier as a conflict space, archaeologists are 
reinforcing Romania’s self-identification as a border region, still poised to defend from 
threats beyond the Danube. During 2014-2015, the early years of the conflict in Ukraine, 
the potential for a threat to Romania beyond the eastern Danube became a bit more 
real. 
 
 
Figure 5. The principal Roman sites in Romania including the Lower Danube Limes (E. Hanscam). 
The present consensus is that frontiers must be understood as zones of interaction, 
places where cultures meet and form something new and unique, a hybrid in-between 
space (Naum 2010). Hingley (2012, 2015) has repeatedly called for recognition of the 
multivocality of Hadrian’s Wall, and recent scholarship has embraced the potential of 
the Hadrian’s Wall landscape for looking critically at cross-cultural interaction (see e.g. 
Nesbitt & Tolia-Kelly 2009; Witcher 2010; Hingley et al. 2012). The Lower Moesian 
Limes have similar potential to inspire the view of Dobrogea as a unique ‘Third Space’ 
(sensu Bhabha 2004), a place of “constant dialogue and remaking” (Naum 2010: 106). 
  EX NOVO Journal of Archaeology, Volume 2 (2017) 63-83  
 
 
77 
This will not happen, however, until the Limes are reconnected to their contemporary 
social landscape and studied as living fortifications, which were also places of meeting 
and exchange, and not just for the military. Until recently, military history has been the 
primary focus for archaeological work done on the lower Danube frontier, although at 
Halmyris archaeologists are beginning investigations into the extensive civilian 
settlement, which will be useful as a potential reference for other studies in the region 
(Karavas & Zahariade 2017). The Lower Moesian Limes were built by the Roman 
Empire to aid in provincial defense, however, like Hadrian’s Wall, they became the 
material foundations supporting a Third Space landscape. They exist today as the living 
embodiment of the Romanian nationalist narrative, one that is militaristic and defensive, 
because there has been no research to highlight the multicultural aspects of this frontier. 
If we want to combat this, we must understand the Lower Moesian Limes as an 
ideological frontier from a postcolonial and globalist theoretical perspective. 
 
 
Figure 6. Looking north across the Danube from Salsovia (E. Hanscam). 
Ideological frontiers are commonly understood as non-physical boundaries, like 
geographical frontiers, they are multidimensional and “places of manifold realities” 
(Naum 2010: 102). Postcolonial theory is one currently popular way to approach both 
frontiers and Roman archaeology, although as Hingley (2014) points out, while Roman 
scholars have, in recent years, begun to consider globalization theory (see e.g. Pitts & 
Versluys 2015); neither postcolonial theory nor globalization are mutually exclusive to 
the other, nor are they a linear theoretical progression. Both have equal potential for 
understanding multidimensional spaces such as the Lower Moesian Limes. Gardner 
(2013) argues for a holistic approach that includes both, noting that while Roman 
archaeology is theoretically lacking compared to many other periods of focus, there is 
nevertheless great potential for theoretical innovation. Postcolonial theory gives us the 
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ability to “describe the diversity and shiftiness of inter-human and human-object 
interactions in the borderlands” (Naum 2010: 106). Globalization, on the other hand, “is 
a long-term historical phenomenon” that emphasizes pluralism and multiculturalism, 
while permitting a “diversity of responses to the Roman past” (Witcher 2015: 200, 215). 
We need to ground studies of the lower Danube frontier with local experiences, 
recognizing the uniqueness of the interactions taking place, but also understanding its 
role as a multicultural phenomenon with a living history.  
 
Conclusion 
It is easy to dismiss overtly biased or agenda-filled archaeologies, but by doing so we fail 
to fully understand the nationalist context that often inspires such work. As Popa (2015) 
writes, archaeology in Romania and Romanian nationalism had a reflexive and reciprocal 
relationship which continues today. The lower Danube Roman frontier is ripe for 
archaeological work which will focus on its multivocal history, but the decades of 
Roman and Dacian entanglement with Romanian identity make it difficult for new 
theoretical perspectives to gain real momentum. Romania sees itself as a defensive 
frontier space rather than a frontier in the sense of a multicultural zone of interaction, 
and because of this, the archaeological work done on the Lower Moesian Limes takes a 
similar military-centered viewpoint. Romania is a frontier in many senses of the word: in 
terms of self-identity, cross-cultural interactions from antiquity to the present day, the 
materiality of the Roman landscape, and even as a place where archaeologists continue 
to confront embedded notions of how the past ought to relate to the present. 
Ideological space is complex, as it can pose as a real barrier to the movement of people. 
Consequently, we should make every effort to comprehend how it was created and how 
it functions today. Archaeologies and other narratives of the past play a critical role in 
this, and as shown with the lower Danube, ideological frontiers likewise support 
archaeological work congruent with the dominant ideology. The prospect of continued 
mass migration along with the disintegration of the European Union makes it 
increasingly important that we question such ideologies and the national spaces they 
sustain, focusing in particular on the entanglement of frontiers both in the past and the 
present.   
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